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SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE FUTURE
LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM
By WILBERT E. MOORE*
WHERE can social science be relevant if we are thinking of
v curriculum revision? Some of the obvious places have already
been noted in earlier papers, and the evidence seems to be that moves
are afoot in those directions. For example, what constitutes evidence
and proof? What is the social science methodology of coming up
with a verifiable statement of fact or relationship? There has been
argument from time to time as to how much of this training the
lawyer ought to have, because it may inhibit him in his adversary
role. He may not really want precise scientific accuracy if that is
against his client's interests. One still has to recall that there may be
a difference in what the lawyer as a practitioner thinks of as evi-
dence and legal proof as distinct from social science proof. It may
be acceptable for him to tolerate both of these systems of truth and
keep them in mind, but as a practitioner, he ought not to confuse
them.
Another area which I think is of considerable interest to social
scientists and lawyers is that of studies of the legal profession itself.
By virtue of various commercial and noncommercial enterprises in the
legal field a good deal of statistical information is available about
lawyers. Missing, however, are many things of a subtler variety
about the practice of law -such as, what does the law-man really
do with his time? What are the proportions of trial work to nego-
tiations, to office paper pushing, to public relations, to serving on
boards, and to doing a variety of things which are not the practice
of law, but rather are efforts to bring business to the firm? This
latter activity is a valid function. Much of the voluntary service
in the United States on boards of trustees, on fund-raising cam-
paigns, and so forth, does come from this highly-educated portion
of the community.
A side comment should be made with reference to the legal
profession. Dean Yegge spoke about the lack of calling on the
part of the legal profession. Perhaps it is more that the training in
law is more directly used by the trainees as a stepping stone to some
other career than is common in other professional fields. Moreover,
there may be among lawyers an excessive orientation to where the
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money is, rather than to where the need is, which may not be the
same place.
It seems that if we want people who have some sort of an
orientation to the fraternity, and particularly to a sense of having
a high calling, then some of the things such as the history of law,
even going back to its medieval origin in terms of the common law
tradition, may be professionally valuable, even though they may not
have any great current relevance, because they illustrate the identity
of law with a continuing tradition in a high calling. Perhaps this is
a subtle point, but a very important one.
What is the expected output of a legal education? A fairly high
proportion of people can pass the bar in some jurisdiction, but
surely that does not justify a three-year curriculum. It is not what
the framers of educational programs had in mind as the mature out-
put of professional training. What should professional training be?
Certainly not the use of the human mind as a very inefficient data-
storage and retrieval system, particularly since the data waste very
fast and spoil quickly. Rather, what is desired is a set of habits-
habits of mind.
First it is important to develop the habit of humility, of finding
out, of not being certain. The medical fraternity has developed with
high skill an air of assurance in dealing with clients, however un-
certain they may be. The legal fraternity, in dealing with a client
who desperately wants assurance that the odds are in his favor, will
tell him that it seems to be this or that, but that if a certain judge
is assigned, it would be better to negotiate and not go to trial. Thus,
the client is left with a great air of uncertainty. Thus, we have to
train clients. Often the problem of professional practice is that the
clients will not play their role right. This habit of humility, which
is kind of forced on lawyers in our particular legal system, is one
which should be expected, and, on the whole, is an admirable trait.
The second habit is that of continuous learning. If information
spoils rapidly, then the problem is to keep at it and to keep finding
out what is going on and not assume that simply because one has
an LL.B. or a J.D. and has passed the bar, that now he is for all
time qualified to practice law. Professional obsolesence will set in in
the legal practice at least as fast as in other fields over the coming
years, and may be really severe if the individual does not approach his
profession as a lifetime of learning rather than a lifetime of practice
of things once learned.
Thirdly, the lawyer is a problem solver, as any professional who
is helping clients is, in some degree. He wants to solve the problem
for his client, whatever that client may be, a public agency, a con-
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stitutional convention, a corporation, or a hapless person accused
of some misdemeanor or crime.
It does not make much difference what the substantive content
of the legal curriculum is if the consequence of that content is the
development of these sets of habits. A problem-solving course in
medieval law would be better than a "hornbook" or "black letter"
law course on some current field of legal specialty.
Aside from the business of social science methodology, where
else can social science feed in, if not precisely into the legal curric-
ulum, or at least into the legal university community, into the inter-
action of specialists as researchers, or into seminars?
One major area is the increased importance of the invention
of organizations and new organizational forms. Organizations in the
private sector are imitative of one another. One looks at another's
organizational chart and says, "Yes, with but a little tinkering we
can adapt that for our purposes." Increasingly, private organizations
depend on the advice of organizational specialists, people who are
specially trained in administrative science, theory of formal organiza-
tions or similar areas. Public organizations, on the other hand, are
mainly the outcome of legislative processes which are dominated by
lawyers. This means that whatever public organizational inventiveness
is being exhibited is the outcome of people who are not necessarily
well trained either in organizational theory or in the ways in which
one can adapt various organizational forms to do particular func-
tions and purposes.
Lawyers, as legislators, or occasionally in administrative and
similar agencies, are experts at rule-making, but not necessarily ex-
perts in estimating the probability that the rules will be obeyed or
that they will in fact accomplish their purpose. Here is where a
juncture of skills is appropriate.
The social scientist may be able to say, "That's a very interesting
rule, but in view of X, Y and Z- the probability that that rule is
going to get you where you want to go is not very high. Let's try
it another way. Let's try it in a different formulation."
It is also true that lawyers are not highly enough trained, or
their habits of mind well enough equipped, to do sequential problem
solving. They tend to set up organizations and say, "Well, this is the
way we're going to go about this," rather than thinking in terms
of a sequence of steps in order to arrive at an outcome. They may
get less help from the social scientists than they had good reason to
expect, because the latter are not very good at it either. Therefore,
we need to pay attention to what is currently called systems analysis,
a concept which has been developed primarily in the engineering
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field, but which is now being used in a variety of areas of concern
both to regulate human order and to solve social problems.
What is different about what the Systems Development Cor-
poration, the Rand Corporation, Arthur D. Little, Stanford Research
Institute, or a variety of these places are doing from what, say, the
well-trained social scientist is doing? Two notions of innovation
have evolved, both of which are worth comment.
The first is the assumption that consequences have consequences;
that is, that one is not doing a once-for-all set of problem solving.
Rather he should look down the road and then back up and say, "All
right. What would we have to do and what would that mean?" so that
he gets the concept of lead time of first inputs, and the consequences
of that leading on to some others. Sociologists generally do not think
that way, and neither do lawyers on the whole. It is a very important
part of organizational inventiveness and of social problem solving
to have that perception which tells one that what he is dealing with
is a sequence of moves and not simply a once-for-all solution.
The other notion which has evolved is that in the problem-
solving development of a systems analysis, if there appear to be some
factors on which one does not have good evidence, to say nothing
of measurement, but which he yet believes are important or might
be important to the outcome, the analyst assigns arbitrary values to
them rather than not accounting for them. He is willing to settle for
bad data, to settle for a plus or minus rather than a real quantity, or
to settle for an arbitrary value. This often means that he comes out
with less than highly precise on-target solutions, but they are likely
to be better solutions than if one had not accounted for these things
at all. Perhaps people not trained in all of the rigors of social science
methodology have a slight advantage over those who think that one
has to be rigorous in problem-solving or it is not worth doing at all,
which, in the real world, may mean that he does not do it at all.
Systems analysis is a great bundle, and not a very homogeneous
one, of what goes on. Operations research, linear programing, game
theory, and cost-benefit analysis are also essentially in this mold of
problem solving in a sequential series.
Another area not unrelated to what has just been discussed is
social science's relevance to legal training and legal practice, and
the use of law as an instrumentality of change. Twenty years ago
this statement might have had some shock effect. It has none at
all at the moment with most of the legal fraternity, certainly not
with professors of law. The notion that law is purely a conservative
force has been pretty generally abandoned. If it has not, the pro-
fession had better re-examine those antiquated notions and get some
of them out of the practice. The articulation of social goals, including
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new ones, seems a proper joint venture for the person who thinks
in value terms and the person who thinks in instrumental terms,
together with those people who may have some expertise at identify-
ing goals on the basis of popular concern - people who know how
to determine what the democratic goals of a society might be.
More and more our society is going in for planning, for a delib-
erate shaping of the future, and for stating future goals as to what the
year 2000 will be like. How can it get there? This question applies not
only to the articulation of these goals and the articulation of the social
instrumentalities for achieving them, but also to thinking sequen-
tially, and therefore not simply in terms of precedent and of the
restraints on the system.
A helpful conceptual distinction is between teleology and
teleonomy. Teleology is the description of a future goal and the
behavior oriented to achieve that goal. Teleonomy consists of pre-
dicting that part of the future which probably cannot be controlled
and making prior ameliorative or adaptive adjustment to that state
of affairs.
In the dynamics of social inventiveness the effort is constantly
being made to increase the teleological capacity and to reduce the
effect of teleonomy of future states. Society has an extremely small
power over the effect of both death rates and birth rates on the labor
force, short of inhumane measures. The labor force of the year
2000 is pretty much at hand and its age structure is going to be
highly predictable with very little margin of error, short of catas-
trophe. That can then be taken as a given factor with regard to a
whole variety of other kinds of plans and implementation, such as
urban congestion, demand for schools, labor input, and various
kinds of economic production. This is not then a teleological state of
affairs. There are going to be too many people, but no one is going
to prevent that. Thus, the attempt is made to take such action as can
be taken, or to take that fact as a parameter, or essentially as a datum.
Finally, let a challenge for joint social science and legal problem
solving be put forth in reference to the national scandal of auto-
mobile insurance. If you have Blue Cross-Blue Shield Insurance,
approximately ninety to ninety-three percent of the premiums paid
for that insurance are returned to the insured population. In the
case of automobile insurance, the percentage is perhaps thirty to
thirty-two. The rest of the money goes to the profits of insurance
companies, to claims adjustors, notably to tort lawyers, trial lawyers,
to court costs and to the support, in part, of a fair proportion of trial
court judges. One looks at that combination of interests, which have
positive interests in the preservation of this wicked system, and he
finds that it is a very difficult problem to solve. If one were thinking
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in terms of systems analysis he would say, "Well, we may not be able
to get ultimate causes, but where would we start?"
The basic problem obviously is the automobile accident. Thus,
we need to know what can be done about the hardware technological
problems, or about the psychological, or the sociological problems
in reference to the accident rate. Perhaps one needs to ask if there
are alternative ways, as has been proposed, of settling claims.
Usually the analogy with workmen's compensation is the one that
immediately gets into the conversation. Surely there must be other
comparable alternatives to the handling of this problem which is
clogging our courts and which, incidentally, supports probably
the poorest segment, in terms of training and talent, of the legal
fraternity.
The settlements are likely to be not only unjust in the gross,
but it also appears that they are regressive. Those people who can
best retain competent counsel and hold out for a just settlement
are the ones who are getting just settlements. Others, who have no
credit at the hospital or with their physicians and who do not have
a variety of other amenities, including the capacity to identify an
attorney, to say nothing of affording one, even if only on a con-
tingent fee basis, are likely to be the ones who will take a quick
settlement offered by the insurance companies. Again, a serious
matter of social policy is involved.
Here, then, is an area where, recognizing the problem of the
legal fraternity turning on part of its own, legal skills are absolutely
requisite. One can see that a variety of other skills are requisite, not
all of which are in the social science field. Some of these skills are
in the technological area, such as, for example, electronic control
of traffic and remote controls which prevent rear-end collisions, not
because the driver has been educated not to tail-gate, but because the
car will not tail-gate. It seems that the systems development approach
is the only way in which one is going to get this type of problem
ameliorated, to say nothing of resolved.
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